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THE DYNAMICS OF GERMAN CARTELS
AND PATENTS. I*
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N TWO articles, of which this is the first, I shall discuss the develop-
ment of cartels in Germany and their relation to patents. The fol-
lowing questions will receive primary consideration:
i. Why did Germany become the homeland of the cartels and the prin-
cipal exporter of technology?
2. What has been accomplished by and with the cartels in the different
stages of development?
3. What was the significance of patents in the development of the cartel
device?
4. What was the effect of these cartels on the state and society in the
several stages of development?
5. How did the German government react to the development of car-
tels and the use of the patent device in the several stages of development?
6. What was the reaction of other countries to the German cartel and
patent system?
7. How did Hitler utilize the cartel and patent system for the purpose
of preparing for and waging the war?
8. How did he use especially the obligations assumed by firms outside
of Germany, to German firms, for his purpose?
I am not going to answer all these questions, but I hope to contribute
something to the understanding of the phenomenon under discussion.
DEVELOPMENT BEFOR~E 11ITLET
Cartels and other forms of monopoly power may be considered from the
point of view of their legal aspects (internal organization and relations to
actual or prospective contractees and governmental authorities) or from
the point of view of their economic aspects (effect on prices, wages and
* This article was the basis of the writer's testimony before the Senate Patent Committee.
The views expressed are the views of the writer only and not those of the Department of Justice
t Adviser in foreign law and property, Department of Justice, Anti-Trust Division; Pro-
fessor of Comparative Law, Georgetown University Law School; formerly practicing attorney
in Mannheim, Germany, specializing in cartel and monopoly law.
t A second article by Mr. Kronstein dealing with the developments after Hitler will appear
in a later issue of the Review.
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salaries, production, and distribution of markets).' All these aspects have
been analyzed again and again.2 The analyses have one thing in common:
they deal with a general type of "cartel and monopoly power." Their aim
is to justify a judgment taken to be correct with regard to the entire sub-
ject matter. In contrast this article deals only with the dynamics of the
German cartels and other forms of monopoly power especially in the light
of their repercussions on the outside world. Such a study is worthwhile
only if free from the dogmatic method so often used in discussions of this
problem by people believing in free trade as the only form of sound com-
merce or by people convinced of the justification of a hostile attitude
against capitalist leaders. None of these groups even tries to understand
the facts. The less prejudiced our study, the more forceful can its con-
clusions be.
Cartels are tools used to accomplish certain aims. They have no lives
of their own. The people behind them give them life. The psychology of
these people, their efficiency or laziness, their defensive or offensive spirit,
make up the spirit of the cartels. The specific intent of the people involved,
however, is of no significance. An agreement between two local banks to
exchange a list of debtors, or to make identical conditions on loans, has in
itself no monopolistic end. The banks want to prevent losses in case of
insolvency of a mutual customer and to have the benefit of the best pro-
tection lawyers can furnish. When in the regular course of business no
bank is open to this customer, then the agreement between the two local
banks becomes, from his point of view and therefore from the public point
of view, a monopolistic agreement. The public has an interest in a mer-
chant who may tomorrow be at the mercy of the btreaucracy of a single
bank organization. 3 This instance shows how a cartel agreement of the
most simple form may develop into a cartel agreement influencing the
public welfare. The general trend and the aims of the cartel are the only
things which count.
' Rudolf Callman defined a cartel as "a contractual association of legally independent entre-
preneurs in the same or a similar field of business, formed with the intent, effect, or potenti-
ality of infltencing the market by means of regidation of competition." Investigation of Con-
centration of Economic Power, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee, 7 5 th Cong. 3 d Sess., at .3,347 (1940).
2See Wolfers, Kartell Problem im Lichte der deutschen Kartelliteratur (1931) for a
bibliography of cartel literature.
3 It is interesting to note that the representative of the German banks made the point that
the government can have no interest in any cartel of banks providing uniform conditions of
credit "since they do not contain any legal binding of the outsiders and have no intention of
governing the market." Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen
der deutschen Wirtschaft. Verhandlungen und Berichte. 3. Arbeitsgruppe. Wandlungen in
den Rechtsformen der wirtschaftlichen Organisationsformen, t. 4. Kartellpolitik 216 (i93o).
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In Germany, since 1879, cartels have been used for three purposes: i)
to satisfy the profit hunger of private business organizations; 2) at the
same time to win influence over the political and economic organization of
the nation on behalf of private interests; 3) to serve as a means of govern-
mental and political power. There is no legal or economic form of a cartel
which would be wholly unfit to serve any of these three aims. A cartel
regulating prices or conditions of delivery may be a powerful means of in-
fluencing, or even making ineffective, the tariff policy of a government.
On the other hand, a complicated cartel with a joint sales agency, patent
exchange, and the like, may prove to be merely a means of obtaining addi-
tional profits. Therefore, a student of the dynamics of the German cartel
system would not accomplish much by describing the several forms of
cartels. 4 He would find that the economic history of all countries in all
times contains many agreements between business organizations concern-
ing prices, working conditions, and the distribution of markets. For the
entire economic machinery such agreements become significant only when
they determine, in connection with other factors, in any way the economic
and political structure of a country.
The German cartel system developed under very specific conditions to
accomplish very specific ends. Germany was the last western power to
enter the industrial field. Until the legislation of the Zollverein made pos-
sible a sufficiently high tariff to permit the establishment of production
plants, it was almost exclusively the customer for products manufactured
by other nations. Friedrich List, who studied economics in the United
States as well as Germany, came to the conclusion that in both countries
any industrial development was impossible so long as domestic industry
was not given a chance to develop under what he called "an educational
tariff." S Although German trade and industry began to develop under the
protection of the Zollverein, the real significance of the teaching of List
did not obtain great influence until much later. Most "economists" were
opposed to Bismarck's tariff bill in 1879. They called such legislation a
gift to the farmers and a deadly blow to the slowly developing German
industry. They were in the good company of the United States Charg6
4 Handler, A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws,
TNEC Monograph No. 58, at 922 (i94i).
5 The basic statement of his conclusions is that, "History teaches us how nations by nature
gifted with all means necessary to conquer wealth and power, may repeatedly change their
economic system to meet the demands of each stage of their development. They can over-
come the state of barbarism by free trade with more progressive nations. After some time
they may, by trade limitations, develop plants, fisheries, shipping and foreign trade, and finally,
in the highest stage, they may slowly return to the principles of free trade to protect their
farmers, manufacturers and merchants against laziness, and to induce them to maintain the
acquired superiority." List, Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie 179 (1841).
646 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 'LAW REVIEW
d'Affaires in Berlin, who wrote to the State Department reporting the en-
actment of the Bismarck tariff statute on February 15, 1879:
The law levying restrictive duties on imported products meets with great opposi-
tion, and its injurious effect in a country which, like Germany, is able to produce so
little of its own food, and is dependent on others for the raw materials of its manu-
facturers, would seem to be self-evident. It is in reality a desperate attempt to resist
the competition of cheap produce and manufactures of the United States and Great
Britain, and to make up in a false way for the great loss of capital and labor in Ger-
many resulting from the heavy drain on the muscular and mental resources of the
nation caused by a huge standing army, and the doubt and loss occasioned in business
by consistent Continental wars and rumors of war. As the reports of our consuls here
show, much of the working capital of Germany is idle ..... 6
On August 15, 1879, we find furthermore in one of the first reports of the
new Ambassador, Mr. White, to the Secretary of State the following state-
ment:
There are some who see in the new protective tariffs nothing but a necessary step to
a reorganization of German industry. The idea appears to be that this industry shall
exist for Germany alone; that the government shall protect it from foreign competi-
tors, while it clothes itself in some new form of guilds, with the object, of course, of im-
proving the condition -of both operatives and employers. This policy of isolation as
regards Prussia has increased since the military successes of 187o, and it is further
strengthened by the necessity the German Government considers itself under of main-
taining a huge standing army.
Mr. White realized the significance of the new "guilds," but he mis-
understood their policy in viewing it as a policy of isolationism. It was
just the opposite.7
The exports of Germany increased as-never before. After this date, in
almost every field German industry developed into the most powerful in
Europe, whereas in 1876 the German Commissioner of the Philadelphia
World Exposition called the German goods "an exhibition of cheap and
bad products."8 England was suddenly confronted with a competitor, not
only in the European countries outside of Germany, but in all parts of the
world. Shipments of hard coal from Germany are an example of the
growth of her exports for this period. From 1886 to 1905 the annual ton-
nage more than doubled.
6 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress,
with the Annual Message of the President, December i, x879, at 36o-6I (1879).
7 Ibid., at 397. The only man who realized what the future would bring was the leader of
the free trade group, Ludwig Bamberger, who stated, "The consequences of high tariffs will
be the resurrection of conditions sometimes called 'the union of industrialists.' The German
sheet metal manufacturers--there are only six--are so sure of themselves that they already are
building its union." Protokolle des Deutschen Reichstag. 4. Periode. 2 Session (1879).
8 Statement of the German Commissioner at the Exhibition Reuleaux.
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This development, which was actually contrary to all the theories of
classical economists, was only possible because of the cartel device used
in combination with high tariff legislation.9 For instance, the mines en-
trusted the sale of all their coal to the Rheinisches Westfaelisches Kohlen-
syndikat,xo a corporation whose shares were owned exclusively by the car-
tel members. No sales to anyone else were permitted. The syndicate be-
came the only buyer of the mined products and the only seller to the public.
It paid to the member firms the same price, no matter to whom the prod-
uct was sold. Coal which sold domestically in Bavaria for 17 RM was sold
abroad in Austria for 8 RM. This was a typical case of the dumping prac-
tices followed by cartels.
Four hundred fifty cartels of similar structure existed in igoi."x The
most important instances can be found in the coal, iron, electrical, chemi-
cal, textile, rubber, timber, paper, glass, and building industries. Ways
and means to regulate the export business and to distribute the profits in
the domestic field and the losses in the foreign field were accomplished in
different ways. For example, the Oberschlesische Roheisensyndikat in
Zabrze provided for the establishment of a joint sales agency, which should
not sell in its own name but rather as agent of each of the member firms.
At the end of six months prices were to be equalized with the result that
each member firm received the same proceeds for the iron delivered.
The Stahlwerksverband A. G. Dilsseldorf compelled all owners of steel
mills to sell all their products to it. The price obtained by the Verband
on selling the product was the basis of accounting with each member.
The contract contains the provision: "An exporting plant shall have no
better but also no worse position than it would have if all member firms
had sold in the domestic and foreign markets what would be their theo-
retical quotas.'
2
In i88o the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabriken, Ludwigshafen, opened
its laboratory to engage in the research of industrial methods for manu-
facturing indigo dyestuffs. "Seventeen years of uninterrupted work was
not too long to accomplish this end. In 1897 the first success was accom-
plished.' 'X3 In i888 the Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (Bayer) began the
9 Von Beckerath, Der moderne Industrialismus 367 (193S).
2o The exceptions to this rule were in themselves quite important, but they should not be
discussed here because they did not change the general aspect. Cf. Fletchtheim, Die rechtliche
Structur der Kartelle (igio).
21 Kartell Engnete i. I. Teil, at 2 (19O2). X2 Ibid., at 273.
r3 Duisberg, Verwaltungsbericht des deutschen Museums 4o-4i (i91o-i i). Since Duisberg
was one of the founders of the German chemical industry and is considered its most representa-
tive speaker his works are a valuable source of material.
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production of pharmaceuticals. 4 Dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals proved
to be the basis of the development of the chemical industry.
Foreign inventions were brought to Germany, improved, and used to a
certain extent, as the basis-of German exports. In 1882 the Continental
Edison Company of Paris granted Emil Rathenau a license to use its basic
bulb patents, which became the basis of the establishment of the A.E.G. s
In 1905 the British Marconi Company assigned the rights under the Mar-
coni patents to Telefunken., 6 The opportunity given to German chemists
to organize research made it possible to overcome the lack of raw material
in Germany, at least to a certain extent, and for a limited period of time
these research laboratories in Germany, made possible by high tariffs and
the cartel system, became the most precious raw material Germany had.
In 1904 Carl Duisberg made the following statement to American chem-
ists:
.... I must now express my satisfaction with the German chemist and the German
chemical industry. In this field lies the strength of Germany, a consequence perhaps
of the peculiarity of the German character. Forced by want of natural resources and
unprovided with American abundance, the German in scientific exploration must pro-
ceed in a cautious and economical manner, always bent on patient and minute re-
search .....
Notwithstanding all [the technological advances of American industry] I think that
we Germans need not be alarmed in the near future. The time for the development of
the organic chemical industries on a large scale has not yet arrived. As I have shown
before, the Germans are masters in manufacture where numberless products are em-
ployed in a series of reactions which finally lead to the finished product, and require
manual labor, which cannot possibly be replaced by machinery, while Americans may
claim to be masters where manufacture on a large scale is concerned, which can be done
by machinery. Yet we must not leave out of consideration the very important facts
that in America wages are extraordinarily high, that the conditions of life are here
much more elaborate, and last, but not least, that the employees, and more particularly
the workmen, manifest a spirit of independence, which has become especially noticeable
during the last few years. By their labor unions the workmen attempt not only to
raise wages to a height which will make manufacturing difficult and less profitable, but
they are also endeavoring to take the control of the works out of the hands of the edu-
cated managers and put it into the hands of irresponsible labor leaders. This move-
ment, as I have above shown, is especially fatal for the chemical industry in which our
,glorious science should be supreme.
[After American natural resources are depleted] it will be found that the only way
that leads to success in chemical manufactures is a combination of science and tech-
nics, the two branches of which eminent representatives are today assembled here,
men who in their spheres have done so much already for the advancement of indus-
14 Duisberg, Lebenserinnerungen 66 (1933).
is Meinhardt, Der Aufhau der Gluehlampenindustrie l2 (1932).
,6 Von Bronk, Telefunken Patents, Twenty-five Years of Telefunken (1928).
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tries. It will be found that technical progress in this industry can only be secured on
the basis of purely scientific research ..... 17
The immediate price to be paid by Germany for this staggering develop-
ment seemed not too high from the point of view of the prevailing Prussian
philosophy. The freedom of action of the individual disappeared more and
more. Free competition, where it existed, became a fight for quotas in the
future cartel, while the liberal economists in the universities closed their
eyes and pretended to live in a period of free trade. Each device for the
protection of the individual became unconsciously a device for control by
cartel and monopoly power. The fact that freedom of action disappeared
in the sphere of life in which it was supposed to be most predominant had
its effect on the entire philosophy of every man whatever his place might
be in the nation.
The Patent Statute of 187718 granted a seventeen-year monopoly to the
individual applicant for the patent as consideration for allowing the in-
vention to be available to the public, and as a reward for his individual
efforts in the interest of science. Werner von Siemens, before the enact-
ment of the first patent statute, praised the protection of the individuality
of the inventor and the benefit to society from such protection.19 But no
German patent statute up to 193620 mentioned the inventor at all.
In i9oo Carl Duisberg praised the provision giving competitors the
right to file objections as the basis for efficient application of the patent
law in the interest of the public welfare.2 1 In 19Ol Duisberg made the
following statement:
17 Duisberg, The Influence of Liebig on the German Chemical Industry (i9o4). Reprinted
in Duisberg, Abhandlungen, Vortraege und Reden (1923).
IS Statute of July i, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt 5ox.
19 Protokoll des Kongresses fuer gewerbliches Eigentum in Frankfurt-am-Main i6 (igoo).
20 Statute of May 5, 1936, 2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1'74 et seq. The new patent statute pro-
vides that the name of the inventor shall be mentioned in the application, in the publication,
and in the patent certificate itself. This protection of the "honor of the inventor" did not
change the principal use made of patents to serve as a means of monopoly. It is quite typical
of the propaganda of the Natiorial Socialist Party to appeal to the individualistic rights of the
inventor to give him a so-called "honor"-and at the same time not only to sustain monopoly
powers of the entrepreneurs but to strengthen it to the extreme. The same thing happened in
regard to the so-called destruction of the "Anonyme" business economy by corporations,
promised by the Nazis, announced in a number of statutes-with the effect that today cor-
porations and monopoly powers are stronger than ever before.
21 Protokoll des Kongresses fuer gewerbliches Eigentum in Frankfurt-am-Main 14 (I9oo). He
blamed the machine tool industry for not filing objections against patent applications often
enough. Such protest alone "gives the Patent Office a chance of a reasonable examination.
The idea cannot be patented, even if it is worth a million. Only if the idea becomes an actual
invention can a patent be asked for. If you are too lenient you do not help the inventor but
you do harm to the industry."
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The percentage of granted patents, which amounted to 36 per cent in i889, rose to
5oper cent in 1899 and to 61 per cent in x9oo. I believe if they continue in i9oi the per-
centage of granted patents will amount to 70 or 8o, or even ioo per cent. It is just hor-
rible. Such a large number of doubtful and bad patents has been granted that many
suits in our courts will follow. Furthermore, the Patent Office induced by the rather
dark language of the amendment of the patent law and by the decisions of the Reichs-
gericht, adopted the practice of no longer setting forth the connections between the
patent and another patent. .2
In 1902 Duisberg had this to say:
You citizens in practical life will understand that you cannot define an invention
by just counting your fingers. Processes for the common good .... shall not be closed
to the industry by granting patents. Some of these processes are not more than a
change of temperature or 'distillation of the product in vacuum, or of similar kind.
That is done continually-the statistics of the Patent Office show that the number of
objections against patents increased very much, especially in the chemical industry.23
A few years later Duisberg observed a complete shift:
In Class 12 [one of two classes of chemical patents] i86o patent applications have
been filed and only ii were contested. In Class 22 [the other class of chemical patents]
1149 patent applications have been filed and only 5 have been contested. The reason
is not that the chemical industry did not like to begin patent litigation but the chemi-
cal industry is tired. It does not care to be continually misunderstood any longer. It
does not like to wait for years until it can have a decision of the Reichsgericht.24
Did Duisberg really believe what he said here, that the lack of under-
standing by the Patent Office, especially on the part of lawyers who were
very much disliked by Duisberg, was the reason for the decrease of patent
litigation? Did he forget that he himself began the elimination of patent
litigation between the dyestuff manufacturers by making a "peace treaty"
in the entire field of dyestuffs with AGFA in i8892S and with other dye-
stuff firms in 1904? There no longer was any need for patent litigation in
the dyestuff field.
22 Protokoll des Kongresses fuer gewerbliches Eigentum in Kln 33 et seq. (igox).
23 Protokoll des Kongresses fuer gewerbliches Eigentum in DUsseldorf in 1902, Zeitschrift
fuer Angewandte Chemie 98o et seq. (x9o8).
24 Protokoll des Kongresses fuer gewerbliches Eigentum in Leipzig 75 et seq. (i9o8). The
same development with regard to patent litigation, which is in the opinion of Duisberg the
basis of patent protection in the interest of the common welfare, can be seen in the electrical
industry. It its tremendous struggle as the owner of most European patent rights for use of
wolfram wire, the A.E.G. was supported by Siemens & Halske and General Electric. In the
beginning more than thirty objectors against the patents appeared. It was one of the biggest
patent fights since the patent statute was enacted. The fight went through the channels of the
Patent Office and of the regular courts until the patent was finally granted. In the end an
agreement was reached between all firms manufacturing bulbs to protect each other's patents,
to exchange information and patents, and to stop the fight. Meinhardt, Entwicklung und
Aufbau der Gluehlampenindustrie 43 (i932).
S Duisberg, Lebenserinnerungen 48 (i933).
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Exactly the same development can be seen in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, again under Duisberg's strong influence. In his very remarkable
memorandum concerning the merger of the German dyestuff firms, sub-
mitted to all members of the boards of these concerns in 1904, he already
mentioned the existence of certain agreements, and complained bitterly
about attacks against the possibility of protecting by patents the manu-
facture of pharmaceutical products. "Who knows how long it will be
until the legislators in Germany, Austria, England and America will adopt
the opinions already existing in the Latin countries to deny patent protec-
tion to pharmaceutical products and to processes for the manufacture of
such products. The same opinion can be found in the trademark field.
Influential groups try to abolish the possibilities of protecting trademarks
for pharmaceutical products." Duisberg was very well aware of the tre-
mendous power which this absolute security of big industry as patent
owners amounted to, not only in the domestic market, where competition
was absolutely excluded, but also in the foreign market, and not only for
the period of the patent's existence, but afterwards. In his memorandum
of 1904 he stated proudly that there was no one who would dare to offer
any competition against the power of the combined firms. In a speech in
London, he stated:
But you will see when the problems have been solved and when the patents have
run out and the manufacture is free to every one, why shouldn't the English and foreign
firms decide to cope with the German firms and compete with them again? In my opin-
ion this would be futile and would be of no avail. Even in Germany where, as we have
seen, the conditions are the most favorable, it would now be scarcely possible, or at
least be a singular coincidence, if the manufacturer, although possessed of energy and
capital, should succeed in building up a new firm in the color line so as to successfully
compete against the existing powerful works, and this applies even more to other
countries.26
A case of which I have intimate knowledge may show us the fate of
an inventor who refused to join any kind of combination. I ask the pardon
of the reader while I tell the story of my father. In 19o he applied for a
patent protecting a process to use tung oil, imported from China, for in-
sulating varnishes. This patent application was the first application for a
polymerization patent. The varnish industry realized immediately the
tremendous importance of this patent and of the process for which pro-
tection was sought. The Association of the Varnish Industry, a corpora-
tion registered in Germany, together with importers and other manufac-
turers, filed objections against the patent. It went up through the divi-
sions of the Patent Office. The inventor risked his whole property, and the
'2 Address in honor of Sir William Perkins in London, July 24, i9o6, at 54 (Perkins Jubilee
ed. i9o6).
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property of friends as well, in an attempt to obtain a patent grant. The
association applied to the Reichsgericht but was unsuccessful. Later each
member of the association filed a new suit in the first instance in the
Patent Office, and again the case went through the courts, until the Reichs-
gericht gave the patent to the inventor--just when the seventeen years
were over. The significance of the patent is shown by the fact that in 19o3
the United States imported 2,998,000 pounds of tung oil, whereas in the
following year, 9,i61,ooo pounds were imported. This increase was a
direct result of the invention2 7 The inventor became a chemist of very
high reputation, but other people became rich.
These instances show how between 1877 and the outbreak of the war
in 1914 the German patent law was perverted. It became a means of
monopoly control; private inventors who tried to use patents for their
protection without giving in to the demands of the monopoly powers were
defeated by the patent procedure."
The development of substantive patent law went in the same direction.
Herman Isay set forth a new doctrine of patent protection, namely, that
the protection should not be limited to the text of the patent itself but
should cover any new process opened by the patent.29 For practical pur-
poses Isay's distinction between the scope of the patent itself and the
scope of the patent protection means that knowledge of the patent itself is
not sufficient to establish whether or not a certain process is protected by
the patent, or what shall be considered as new.30
A principle of even more general application than in the patent field,
namely, the principle of individual freedom to do business, as provided in
the Gewerbeordnung of J9oo, 3 1 had the same fate. The process of per-
verting the free economy was favored in a very fateful way by a shift in
public opinion toward disfavor of free competition. The victory of the
opinion considering free competition as a chaotic economy deprived the
institution of competition of its character as a regulating factor in the
economy. The conception of competition was defined by the courts in a
thoroughly anarchistic way. It is really astonishing how easily economic
competition and institutions hostile to dictatorship were sacrificed to the
271 Mattiello, Protective and Decorative Coatings i6 (194i).
28 The leading lawyer of big business in Germany, Herman Isay, was of another opinion.
He called the patent policy a weapon of small industry. See Isay, Die Funktion der Patente
im Wirtschaftskampf (1927).
291say, Patentgesetz 19i (i930).
3o Besso, Grenzen des Erfindungsschutz 13-14 (1934).
31 Statute of June 3o, i9oo, Reichsgesetzblatt at 871.
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private monopolistic trend. The liberal institution of competition itself
was even handed over to the monopolistic powers who used it as an in-
strument in the destruction of free competition.
The result of this development was that the principle of free competition
was transformed into the opposite principle of senseless fighting between
economic powers. Everything was permitted, even though it was outside
the pale of business and inconsistent with law or good morals. During the
period between 1879 and 1914 the whole development was based on the
decision of the government and the Reichstag to enact a high tariff statute
and could have been changed by the government in the same way.32 This
action was at least a remainder to industry that the government had the
power to act. Patents could be influenced by the government in the fol-
lowing ways: i) by compulsory license; 33 2) by governmental use of
patents according to administrative decisions;34 and 3) by refusing com-
pensation for use in the interest of the government. 35 Here is one of the
essential differences between the conditions before and those after the
first World War.
Another element, however, in favor of the government was its bureau-
cratic and military control of all that was going on in the country. The
significance of the bureaucratic and military power of the German ad-
ministrative machinery and of the social preeminence of the people con-
nected with it, before 1914, cannot be overestimated. Although the
groups in social life which were later to destroy the government already
32 An amendment to the tariff statute was proposed by a member of the Reichstag, but was
rejected. This proposal provided that import duties would be abolished "if syndicates, trusts,
cartels, conventions, etc., should demand unreasonable prices in Germany." Ausschuss zur
Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirtschaft. Verhand-
lungen und Berichte. 3. Arbeitsgruppe, Wandlungen in den Rechtsformen der wirtschaft-
lichen Organizationsformen, t. 4. Kartellpolitik 2 (1930).
33 The amendment to the patent statute of June 6, i9ii, Reichsgesetzblatt 243, provided,
"If the owner of a patent refuses to permit someone else to use his invention in spite of the
offer of a reasonable fee and guarantee for the payment of the fee, the other person can be
granted the permission to use the invention, if such grant is considered necessary in the public
interest [compulsory license] and the permission may be granted with certain limitations or
may be granted under certain conditions."
34 Ibid., at § 5, 2 provided, "The patent has no effect to the extent that the invention shall
be used for the Army, Navy or in other ways in the public interest, in accordance with the
determination of the government. However, the patent owner is entitled to ask for reasonable
compensation from the Reich or the state which applied in its interest for the limitation of the
patent protection. If no understanding between the patent owner and the government can be
reached the court may determine compensation."
3S The court had no jurisdiction to decide about a case against the government for infringe-
ment of a patent if the patent had been used to accomplish strictly governmental aims. Isay,
Patentgesetz 4, n. 71 (1930).
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were in the making, society did not develop the state of "pluralism" in
which private groups subordinate the national policy to their own inter-
ests and ends.
36
How did the world react to this development in Germany? Very slowly,
just as it did after the events of 1933. The first reactions were in patent
law. The English statute of I9o737 provided for the loss of a British patent
for non-use in the British Isles. The result of this measure was an increas-
ing influence of German industry in the internal economy of the British
Empire itself. The two large dyestuff groups (Agfa-Bayer and Badische-
Cassella) acquired large terrains in England "which [are] fit to serve for
plants for the dyestuff industry and even for the manufacture of all in-
organic intermediaries or tar distillations." 38 Duisberg seemed not too
much concerned about the reaction to the German expansion. He wrote:
We studied the conditions in all directions and we learned surprisingly that coal is
much cheaper in England than in our country, that the wages for workers are much
lower than in our country, that the taxes to be paid and the other governmental bur-
dens are much lower than in our country. The only thing that is more expensive is the
freight, which is not important at all.39
36 The conception of "pluralism" was used first by Carl Schmidt, the analyst of Germany's
constitutional law-who is highly gifted with intelligence by lacking in character, and who
served all governments which Germany had after 1914 as a capable adviser.
37 Patents and Designs Act, 7 Edw. VII, c. 29, §§ 24-27 (1907), provided in effect that the
patentee shall be deemed to have been abused his granted rights in the following circumstances:
(a) If the patented invention be one capable of being worked in the United Kingdom, and is not
being worked within the United Kingdom on a commercial scale and no satisfactory reason can
be given for such non-working. (b) If the working of the invention within the United King-
dom on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad
of the patented article by the patentee or person claiming under him or by persons directly
or indirectly purchasing from him or by other persons against whom the patentee is not
taking, or has not taken, any proceedings for infringement. (c) If the demand for the patented
article in the United Kingdom is not being met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms.
(d) If by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a license or licenses upon reasonable
terms, the trade or industry of the United Kingdom or the trade of any persons or d1ass of
persons trading in the United Kingdom or the establishment of any new trade or industry
in the United Kingdom is prejudiced and it is in the public interest that a license or licenses
should be granted. (e) If any trade or industry in the United Kingdom or any person or class
of persons engaged therein is unfairly prejudiced by the conditions required by the patentee,
whether before or after the passing of this act, for the purchase, hire, license or use of the
patented article or to the using or working of the patented process.
38 Duisberg, Geselschaft deutscher Chemiker x962 et seq. (i9o8).
39 Ibid. It is interesting that Duisberg immediately used this opportunity to threaten
his political adversaries by saying, "Our high-tempered persons in the political field should be
warned to be careful. For the time being we only intend to use our patents in England, which
is at the present time important for us, and thus England will not gain a stronger position
in the chemical field. All that the English newspapers wrote about this is exaggeration. We
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The United States did not follow the English example. It did just the
opposite, signing a treaty with Germany on February 23, i909, provid-
ing:
Art. I. The provisions of the laws applicable, now existing or hereafter to be enacted
of either of the Contracting Parties, under which the nonworking of the patent, work-
ing pattern (Gebrauchsmuster), design or model carries the invalidation or some other
restriction of the right, shall only be applied to the patents, work patterns (Gebraucbs-
muster), designs or models enjoyed by the citizens of the other Contracting Party
within the limits of the restrictions imposed by the said Party upon its own citizens.
The working of a patent, working pattern (Gebrauchsmuster), design or model in the
territory of one of the Contracting Parties shall be considered as equivalent to its
working in the territory of the other Party.40
At this time the United States was in its developmental stage. The
desire to get the most modem products the world produced was so great
that even the highest tariffs introduced by Congress did not prevent those
who imported German goods from bringing them into the country. The
United States was not too seriously interested in the international market
and in competing with English or German firms. Furthermore, the
American firms found much larger profits in using the natural resources
of their country than they could ever hope to get out of the relatively
small profits from production which required experience and expensive,
risky research with strict organization.4'
An interesting attempt to resist the abuse of the patent system was
made by Switzerland, which refused to give any chemical patents up to
19o6. The German chemical industry was very much excited about this
fact and urged the German government to include a special provision in
the commercial treaty between Germany and Switzerland requiring that
Switzerland grant such patents. Interesting are the figures mentioned
by the speaker for German industry. He alleged that Switzerland estab-
lished six or seven chemical plants "which manufacture in my opinion
about 20 to 25 million francs of dyestuffs. Switzerland needs about 5
came with two chemists and 50 workers. What does that mean as compared with 5oo chemists
and i8,ooo workers which we employ here? But let us be clear about that. The beginning is
made and who knows what comes. England may enact a statute providing high tariffs. Under
such circumstances we should be careful and not go too far in our social legislation in order to
make more inconvenient for us the conditions of production."
40 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 224 (1909).
41 Duisberg, The Influence of Liebig on the German Chemical Industry (19o4), reprinted in
Duisberg, Abhandlungen, Vortraege und Reden (1923).
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million francs. About 15 million francs dyestuff are exported out of Switz-
erland. The export of dyestuffs from Switzerland to the United States
amounts to about 5 million tons-even from Switzerland to Germany
dyestuffs are imported [in the amount of 3 million francs]. ' '42
The second reaction was the increase of import duties. Here the United
States led, while England did not dare to leave its traditional policy of
free trade because of the extremely difficult Empire problems which a high
tariff policy was sure to raise. As high as the tariffs enacted by the Ameri-
can legislators may have been, the special provisions avoided any serious
threat to the German policy as described above. Duisberg pointed out
that the tariff policy of the United States did not affect the import of
intermediary products which could be transformed in the United States
by German owned plants.43 Furthermore he claimed that the import duty
in pharmaceuticals amounted to almost ioo per cent without interfering
with the German export policy.44 He indicated that he did not expect a
change of the tariff, but he clearly anticipated the day in which that might
happen under othe circumstances.
The third reaction was to paralyze the German cartels by cooperating
with them through international cartels. Cooperation was necessarily
connected with the abandonment of the policy of dumping. This develop-
ment of international cartels was still at an early stage and did not go too
far before 1914. 45 For example, German industry could agree to join the
chloride of magnesium cartel and the bromine agreement without giving
42 Protokoll des Kongresses fuer gewerbliches Eigentum in Hamburg x43 et seq. (1902).
43 Duisberg's Memorandum, submitted to the members of the boards of all dyestuff firms
in Germany in 1904.
44 Duisberg, Lebenserinnerungen 88 (i933).
45 Interesting instances are the chloride of magnesium cartel and the bromine agreement.
Under the cartel members had established quotas, which were reduced if new members came
in. Production and prices were fixed. Even though Great Britain produced this item most of
the German production was used there. Therefore, in order to secure this market, agreements
incorporating similar provisions were made with English producers. In the brome agreement
all brome derivatives were sold to an international cartel to which English, German, French,
and Italian firms belonged. The management of this cartel was entrusted to the Vereinigten
Chemischen Fabriken auf Aktien vorm. E. Schering, predecessor to Schering-Kahlbaum in
Berlin, the parent corporation of Schering, Inc., of New Jersey. These two international cartels
represent two different types of international cartel organizations, since in the first cartel the
production and prices of two countries are regulated by agreements between two cartels while
in the second form only one cartel existed whose sales agency distributed orders and profits.
Both forms of the cartel are equally important for the purpose of avoiding dumping.
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up its general policy, because not the slightest difficulty was encountered
in selling its production in these two fields; hence the expensive dumping
process was unnecessary from the German point of view. In spite of the
general interest which these early international cartels have, they cannot
be considered an efficient defense against all industrial oppression.
The international patent cartels in existence before 1914 had the aim
rather of giving foreign corporations, which controlled an invention, ac-
cess to Germany than of giving German firms access to markets abroad.
In 1883 in the electric light bulb industry, the system of exchange of in-
formation and patents developed which finally led to the Patent-Inter-
essen-Gemeinschaft on March 15, 1911. This association, of which the
General Electric Company was a member, guaranteed each member a free
license under all the patents of all other members and the joint protection
of these patents against any attack. Outsiders could get a license only if
the association decided unanimously to grant the license. Since in this
field the American development preceded the German, we are more inter-
ested in the American inventions than in the German. A similar case
could be found relating to radio patents. The Marconi Wireless & Tele-
graph Co., Ltd., an English corporation organized in 1897, controlled the
patents relating to the use of radio on ships. Before 1911 Telefunken could
not even prevent Marconi from controlling the wireless on German ships.
Telefunken's research produced new inventions in other related fields
however, while Marconi became interested in participating in the German
market in fields other than wireless telegraph. Therefore Telefunken and
Marconi agreed to exchange patents; this agreement was the basis for a
very efficient world distribution system. Telefunken became a partner of
Marconi in the Belgian Compagnie de T6lgraphie Sans Fil, and a world-
wide distribution of markets was in the stage of preparation when the
first world war broke the' contract for the time being.46
All in all the resistance of the outside world against the new German
cartel and tariff system grew from year to year. At the same time German
industry developed more and more. The clash between Germany and
other nations became unavoidable. The German fortress, from which
goods could be sold cheaper throughout the world, became increasingly
an encircled fortress which in the end could save its existence only by
bursting its encirclement through aggressive use of its pent-up resources.
The more immediate the danger of war, the greater became the significance
46 Von Bronk, Telefunken Patente, in 25 Jahre Telefunken (1928).
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of the government as the best customer of industry. In 1914 Germany
entered the war as a nation which appeared to be unified to a degree never
before seen, but as a matter of fact the government was only the most
powerful group within a number of groups which existed inside the nation,
among them the cartels and the unions. The question was, how long could
it remain the most powerful group, especially since the outbreak of the war
deprived the government of its most effective method of control, through
the tariff policy. How long could the full outbreak of the domestic crisis,
the development of "pluralism," be avoided?
In the very beginning of the war the government as the largest cus-
tomer could, directly or indirectly, dictate conditions. But industry
realized more and more that the government had no choice other than to
give in to the demands of the cartel and, to a certain degree, to the de-
mands of the unions. Even if German economy had not made any real
preparation for the war,47 Rathenau and Koeth, organizers of the German
war economy, nonetheless found ready the entire equipment they needed,
namely, an organized economy which could easily produce a maximum of
certain goods, restrict production of other goods, and replace some scarce
products with newly invented substitutes. The whole machinery of the
cartels, built up by private groups for the purpose of -cornering markets
and distributing profits which had been dependent on governmental
policy, became for the moment the tool of the government's war policy.
The cartels were made the basis of all the so-called "war corporations."
When these corporations were established, it was intended not only to
provide a supply of raw materials by seizure but also to purchase goods in
the domestic market and to import other goods. All persons involved
were accustomed to see products, orders, and profits distributed and
divided. 48 Von Beckerath, who had a very good chance to observe the
activities of the cartels himself, made the statement that this "war serv-
ice" was a very profitable business for the cartels and the industrialists be-
hind them.49 The longer the war went on, the more the government had to
learn that it was absolutely dependent on the fullest cooperation of industry,
which was expected not only to produce but also to substitute its pro-
cessed goods for natural products to a very large extent. This program of
substitution formed the basis of the similar development which has be-
come of greatest importance in the present war. The major problems
47 Heymann, Die Rechtsformen der militaerischen Kriegswirtschaft (1921).
48 Ibid., at 137.
49 Von Beckerath, Der moderne Industrialismus 257 (1935).
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attacked were synthetizing rubber, ° nitre and nitrogen,5' and the develop-
ment of metallurgical alloys.2
so "This product was produced from the derivatives of coal tar. Isoprene is a carbohydrate.
This could be transformed into rubber by polymerization. This rubber was identical with the
natural rubber, as the experiments of Dr. Harries proved. We were successful in transforming
the higher homolog of isoprene, methyl isoprene or dimethylbutadiene, and the lower homolog
of isoprene, butadiene, into two new forms of rubber. These two forms were elastic and similar
to natural rubber, but different in several respects.
"Although we could not hope to manufacture isoprene as cheaply as the product obtained
from natural rubber, we nonetheless began to manufacture methyl rubber, which was rich in
carbohydrate, since it was much easier to produce and had a higher degree of homolog. This
Was done at a time when natural rubber was very expensive (20 RM per kilo). Therefore it
was not difficult to put the artificial product on the market. [When the price of rubber fell the
artificial product no longer went to market.]
"On the other hand, the experiments in the research laboratory were continued without in-
terruption, to improve the quality of the product and to decrease the costs of manufacture.
We tried to use not only methyl rubber but also the two other synthetic forms of rubber. New
experiments were made, together with some rubber companies in our neighborhood, especially
with Clouth in K61n. We tried to use the different synthetic rubber forms for all purposes."
Duisberg, Lebenserinnerungen ioi et seq. (x933). .
s, "A great problem solved by us was the problem of synthetic nitrogen. Before the war
Badische Anilin manufactured ammonia out of nitrogen in accordance with the Haber and
Bosch process. When the war broke out a plant was just being established for the production
of I5o,ooo tons of ammonia annually. In the meantime Ludwigshaven began to double its
plant.
"Since it was necessary to give our farmers as much nitrogen as possible, the production of
calcium nitrogen in the plant in the neighborhood of K6in was raised to 120,000 tons. We
had the Bavarian plant in Trostberg which produced 25,ooo tons. Two new governmental
plants were established in the province of Sachsen and in Upper Silesia. The Reich made a
contract with the Badische Anilin to establish a plant with a productive capacity of 15o,ooo
to x8o,ooo tons of ammonia sulphate. This plant was established in the neighborhood of Merse-
burg and began work in 1917. This plant was called Leunawerk and was organized by the
Badische Anilin. Germany became self-sufficient in nitrogen before the war ..... Because of
the needs of the war, German industry became independent in another field, the supply of
sulphur." Ibid., at i2 et seq.
s' .... manganese is not only important as a means of alloying in the preparation of steel,
but it is also important for use as a means of deoxidation. Many experiments were made to
save manganese as an alloying material and to substitute it as a deoxidation means. Very
soon we learned to save manganese. Calcium carbide was discovered as a full substitute for
manganese in connection with deoxidation, and thereby we cheapened the manufacture of
steel by 8 pfennig per ton. The large increase of the price for nickel and chrome made it pos-
sible to utilize mines in Germany which could not be utilized earlier. The Stahlwerke Richard
Lingenberg in Remscheid introduced steel which was poor in nickel for these purposes. With
the help of electro-steel ovens wolfram would be substituted for molybdenum. The best mine
for molybdenum oxide lead was found in the neighborhood of Garmisch in Bavaria.
"To make us independent of foreign countries in the field of aluminum, three plants were
established in Germany at places at which electrical power was cheap and ample. These
plants supplied the entire German needs of aluminum. We used in the beginning Hungarian
bauxite as raw material, and later German clay.
"In Bitterfeld a new plant for the manufacture of a new metal, just discovered, was estab-
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The government had the power not only to grant compulsory licenses
to firms interested in the inventions which were patented as a result of
this research, but also to prevent the publication of any patent which
might be important for war materials. The government did not use this
power in many cases, especially insofar as big industries were concerned.
No source is available which gives information on this point but I know
of only one case in which the government prevented the publication of a
patent. In this case the inventor and the applicant were relatively weak.3
The two most efficient.uses the government Ihade of its economic in-
fluence were the following: i) The government itself became a manufac-
turer, especially of aluminum. Research findings prepared by the Metall-
gesellschaft and Griesheim Elektron were utilized for the establishment
of a large government aluminum plant, which still remains under the con-
trol of the government.5 4 2) The establishment of compulsory cartels and
the compulsory merger or closing'of plants was brought about. Insofar as
the industrialists could not agree in the organization of cartels and the
government accordingly could not rely upon such cartels in certain fields,
the government established compulsory cartels.55
The practical history of the compulsory associations as established dur-
ing the war shows, however, that it was not so much the government
command which regulated these compulsory cartels as it seemed. After
the cartels were once established, it could be seen quickly that the big
industrialists inside the compulsory cartels had a more or less absolute
leadership. Very often, if not in most cases, the suspicion arose that the
cartels were made compulsory only on the request of the big fellows be-
cause of the refusal of one or another of the small industrialists to join.
There is no doubt that at the beginning of the war the government h'ad
a very strong psychological position which was not used at all. In spite of
their conservatism the Prussian militarists were very much influenced by
lished. This metal, called 'Electryon,' was made out of magnesium alloyed with manganese
and aluminum. This metal was manufactured out of a by-product of phosphate salt fabrica-
tion of chlorine magnesium. Electryon was a very good substitute for aluminum." Ibid., at
125 et seq.
s3 The patent involved dealt with the substitution of fats and oils in printing.
S4 "A, new big plant for the production of aluminum will be completed very soon. This
plant will not use foreign bauxite but German clay, so that we will now be independent from
foreign markets in the field of acetic acid and also in the sale of aluminum, and even in peace
will be able to substitute large amounts of imported copper for domestic aluminum." Duis-
berg, 24 Z. Elektrochemie 369 (1918), 38 J. Soc. Chem. Ind. i88A (igig).
ss The idea of compulsory associations was not unknown in the German law. Such com-
pulsory organizations were known for quite a long time, as for instance, fishery associations.
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the liberal economic theory that government should not interfere in busi-
ness. The government lost its chance very soon. From month to month a
change in public opinion with regard to social classification could be seen.
Public opinion, even in the groups of militarists themselves, considered a
Wirtschaftsfuehrer as the type of person replacing the generals and high
officials in the social classification. The ideology of the government had
nothing to offer against the demands of technologists, industrialists, and
financiers. Walther Rathenau made the only attempt to give an ideo-
logical basis to the fact that industry and business had to devote them-
selves to the aim of the government in time of war. Rathenau established
for the first time the character of an enterprise as a kind of public good,
subject to the commands of the government, which alone can be respon-
sible to the national state1 6
The development after the war was over can be understood more easily
if we have in mind the following facts:
i. German industry lost its foreign subsidiaries, foreign patents, and
foreign property.
2. Other countries could freely establish high tariffs while the German
government lost its power to regulate tariff legislation independently.
3. German industry was confronted with a large number of new Euro-
pean states, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, which all
had new tariff borders and tried to become as nearly self-sufficient as
possible.
4. German industry had to import raw materials which, up to i918,
it had in its own territory, especially zinc, which now had to be imported
to a large extent from Upper Silesia, which was under Polish jurisdictionS 7
5. German industry, on the other hand, had a very much greater ca-
pacity than it had before the outbreak of the war, because during the war
new plants were built, technical processes developed, and equipment in-
stalled without any consideration for the economic future. The same
happened in other countries, which up to the war sent their raw materials
to Germany to have them transformed into finished products.
6. The government itself lost not only its tariff power but also its social
standing. The industrial class prevailed in the social structure of the
nation.
7. The government had to rely upon industry in connection with the
performance of many provisions of the peace treaty, for instance, that
56 Rathenau, Von kommenden Dingen 145 (1918).
S7 Bergmann, Der Weg der Reparationen 112 (1926).
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requiring the export of a certain amount of coal dyestuffs to the victorious
countries, which provision could only be performed by the dyestuff in-
dustry.
8. The government had to rely upon industry in the problem of de-
mobilization and of transferring the returning army men to jobs in in-
dustry.
9. The government lost its position as the largest customer for arma-
ment purposes and could not reestablish this position.
Two outstanding events made the situation much worse. First, there
was inflation. While the government could not cancel its foreign debt
and while its domestic debt reappeared almost immediately, especially
the debt connected with the peace treaty, industry undertook to cancel
its own debt by the inflation policy. Second, the threat which existed
during the whole inflationary period that a merchant might lose his entire
capital by selling his products for paper marks without regard to the re-
placement costs, became the basis for the cartel agreements between pro-
ducers, wholesalers, and retailers, which will be discussed later.
During the inflation the industrial merger movement developed very
fast. The statistics relating to corporations in the time of inflation do
not give us a true picture, because business organizations were estab-
lished practically without foundation. The increasing number of corpora-
tions does not clearly reveal the fact that during the inflation period
the control of the entire German corporation capital began to be confined
,to an ever decreasing number of people. In this connection it may be
stated that according to the statistics of 194o the management of 170
German corporations controlled 56 per cent of the entire German business
capital- 8
Inflation's worst immediate effect on the German economy was that
industry, which already had a capacity much exceeding any regular Ger-
man market, increased its technical capacity to a larger extent. Then
came a period of "rationalization" and again German capacity grew even
further, with the help of American loans.
After this development the crisis began, for there was practically no
idea what to do with this tremendous industrial power. Pre-war history,
the development during the war, and this last development established a
complete domination of German economic life by the industries which
used these devices: the monopolization of products, the patent monopoly
power, and predominant capital power. In all fields in which any group
5s Frankfurter Zeitung (Nov. i6, 194o).
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could exercise one of these powers, the industrialists, after they completed
their own cartels, informed the wholesalers that they would only be sup-
plied if they became members of the wholesalers' cartel, and the whole-
salers informed the retailers that they would only be supplied under the
same conditions as those under which the industry supplied them. A
typical example of the conditions in a field in which the production was
monopolized is the Association of German Screw and Nut Producers.
This association made an agreement with the Association of Screw Whole-
salers. The by-laws of the association of wholesalers read as follows:
"The purpose of this association is the regulation and improvement of the
German screw business, especially the fixing of prices in the screw trade
and the performance of eventual contracts to be made with the Association
of German Screw and Nut Producers, Dflsseldorf." No member of the
producers' association (and as early as 1929 there were no independent
producers) could supply any wholesaler or any one else who was not a
member of the trade association. The agreement between the two associa-
tions regulated the kind of products to be sold and the price and conditions
of delivery, not only between manufacturers and wholesalers but also be-
tween wholesalers and retailers or any other kind of customers.
Immediately after the inflation there was practically no field in the coal,
iron, steel, or metal industries in which the producer had not an absolute
control over the sale of his products reaching from his plant to the last
consumer. It would not serve our purpose to describe many instances of
these contracts. Nevertheless brief reference may be made to the decisions
of the cartel court where typical situations in which businessmen resorted
to this court are described.$'
A case typical of the second situation, the monopolization based on
patent power, is the case of Telefunken. Telefunken controlled the Flem-
ing patent which protected the cathode detector tube and the electrode
tube, and patents relating to the circuit.10 That gave Telefunken, up to
1941 a subsidiary of Siemens & Halske and A.E.G., an absolute control
over the radio industry, wireless industry, and all enterprises manufactur-
ing related medical equipment.6' In the field of radio the Government in-
s9 The cartel court is organized in accordance with the provisions of the cartel decree of
1923. The cartel court was abolished in i94o and its tasks were entrusted to the Reichs-
wirtschaftsgericht. The jurisdiction of the cartel court or of the Reichswirtschaftsgericht
exists, for instance, in cases in which a member of a cartel alleges that the continuance of his
membership is inconsistent with public interest and cannot be expected.
6o Von Bronk, Telefunken Patente, in 25 Jahre Telefunken (1928).
61 Equipment to examine heart activity and auditory disturbances is an example.
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duced Telefunken to give a certain number of licenses.6 2 From the very
beginning, however, the grant of any license was made dependent on the
joining of a cartel. Whereas the full effect of this system did not become
clear before Hitler came into power, the appropriation of the associations
of the radio industry and the radio trade by the National Socialist govern-
ment amounted to a subordination of an existing commercial system under
the political command of the party. The regulation of the market was
accomplished before Hitler, as a market regulation by patent, effective
from the manufacturer to the last consumer. That could be accomplished
although the patent referred only to a relatively small part of the product
sold. The National Socialist government was so much concerned when
one of the important Telefunken patents came to a natural end that the
government by decree provided that the patent "market regulation"
should continue.'
Discussions of the German monopoly situation have been confined too
often to I. G. Farben. 64 This combine may be classified between the group
monopolizing by patents and that monopolizing by capital power. More
and more the chemical industry began to apply for patents on practically
everything. The research laboratories of the few remaining chemical
works, connected among themselves by cartel and working agreements,
systematically studied entire fields and closed them by a large number of
patents. That was true in the development of plastics (the participants
were I. G. Farben and Rohm & Haas) and in most pharmaceuticals (the
three groups of enterprises participating were I. G. Farben; Merck, Boeh-
ringer and Knoll, connected by a joint sales agency and an agreement re-
lating to the exchange of information, etc.; and Schering-Kahlbaum A. G.).
Each publication in any chemical review or each patent application of any
applicant in any country was given to the staff of the research laboratory
to find anything that could be patented, no matter if the patent was a
patent of evasion or supplement or protection against other inventors.'
62 As far as other uses of the tubes were concerned, it was extremely difficult to get any
kind of license from Telefunken. I myself tried, on behalf of a client who had a very excellent
reputation as a scientist, to get a compulsory license for the manufacturing of equipment for
testing human hearing. The only success was that Telefunken itself brought the article on the
market.
63 Kartell Rundschau 412 (1939).
64 Some people may be inclined to believe that I. G. Farben is the only case.
6s The terms patents of evasion, supplement, and protection are technical. I understand
these terms as follows: i) A patent of evasion is a patent accomplishing the same result as a
previous patent of another patentee without infringing it. This is especially so if the new
patent is not based on any new theory and does not constitute any economic improvement.
2) A patent designated as a supplemernt patent is one whose only aim is to secure protection
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But in fields in which the patent situation had theoretically permitted
competition, the factual power of the capital investment made such com-
petition impossible. The capital required to build up efficient plants in
the field of the heavy industries and the chemical industry, as well as in the
machine and metal industry, became so tremendous that only very rich
groups could attempt to enter any of these fields. As soon as a plant was
completed, as for instance the nitrogen plant in Leuna or the plant of the
Vereinigte Ahmiinumwerke in Lauta, a competitive plant would have been
not only a disaster for the new entrepreneur but also for the' old entre-
preneur and for the public. Therefore, no bank would finance such an
enterprise. The Vereinigte Aluminumwerke obtained a patent relating to
the manufacture of aluminum out of clay in igi9. If it had tried to use
this patent its just completed plant would have lost its value; therefore,
the Vereinigte Aluminumwerke gave a license to its Italian subsidiary,
but did not itself use this patent until a number of years later.66
So we learn that the-government was confronted with the fact that
the entire production and market conditions were regulated by the man-
agement of a number of corporations which from year to year either de-
creased or became dependent on each other. To say that the government
had a domestic policy when production and markets were regulated by
monopoly powers, and wages and salaries by labor unions and employers,
is to misstate the fact. Moreover, industry was confronted with a new
international problem, which Hitler later characterized by the statement,
"Export or die." The earlier situation of German offensive and foreign re-
action to it was now reversed: the outside world, including the new Euro-
pean states, acted first by enacting high tariffs, by depriving Germany of
her tariff power, by licensing systems for imports, for foreign corporations
doing business, and for their establishment of local subsidiaries, by seizure
of patents and trademarks.
None of the devices used by German industry before the last war could
help. The only governmental measure or policy which helped was the
agreement between Germany and Russia relating to the financing of Ger-
man goods to Russia. German industry did not have any chance other
than i) to find loopholes in the exclusionary system of the world for what-
ever reasons these loopholes might exist; or 2) to find help from "within"
for a previously patented process beyond the seventeen year protection period provided by
the patent statute. This is accomplished by patenting other aspects of the old invention. 3) A
patent of protection is one which blocks the way to patents of evasion or to any real technical
progress because it secures the investment of the owner of another patent.
66 Marcus, Die grossen Chemiekonzerne (1929).
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the outside world. Examples of these two techniques may be found in the
chemical industry.
America excluded German dyestuffs and chemicals after peace was re-
established and included in the Tariff Act of 19226 the following provi-
sion:
If there is no similar competitive article manufactured or produced in the United States
then the ad valorem rate shall be based upon the United States value as defined in
subdivision (d) of Sec. 402, Title IV. For the purposes of this paragraph any coal-tar
product provided for in this Act shall be considered similar to or competitive with any
imported coal-tar product which accomplishes results substantially equal to those ac-
complished by the domestic product when used in substantially the same manner .....
If there is any competitive article manufactured or produced in the United
States the import duty is much higher. The German industry learned to
use this provision for its own benefit in two ways:
i. Nitrogen. In 1930 Mr. Bueb, the manager of the nitrogen plant of
I. G. Farben, made the claim before a committee of the German Reichstag
investigating the structure of the German economy that nitrogen had not
been produced in the United States in spite of the seizure of the patent."
The often alleged reason that it could not be produced during the war was
that the patents did not describe the process sufficiently. This was veri-
fied by Duisberg who later reported that the military control commission
of the Allies demanded at the end of the war not only the processes used
for production of powder, explosives, and gas but also the processes for
production of raw materials such as nitric acid, ammonia, and sulphuric
acid, which are the basis of every chemical plant. Much of this had noth-
ing to do with explosives and war materials; the demands came only be-
cause of a desire for economic profit.69 A list of the import duties to be
paid for nitrogen manufactured by Leuna (I. G. Fayben) in the different
countries was available. 70 This list states that imports into the United
States are free, under position 1583, in accordance with Paragraphs 27 and
28 of the Tariff Act of 1922 as quoted above. So one loop-hole was found
to bring nitrogen into the United States. After 1923 the German proc-
esses were improved to a very large extent and new patents in this field
were taken out. Imports into this country were entrusted to the Synthetic
67 42 Stat. 862 (1922).
69 Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen
Wirtschaft. Verhandlungen und Berichte. 3 Die deutsche chemische Industrie i50 (1930).
69 Duisberg, Lebenserinnerungen 134 (1933).
70 Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen
Wirtschaft. Verhandlungen und Berichte. 3 Die deutsche chemische Industrie 188 (193o).
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Nitrogen Corporation which was under formal control of an American
friendly to I. G. Farben interests.
2. Dyestuffs. The Alien Property Custodian of the last war was es-
pecially active in regard to dyestuff corporations. He repeatedly stated
that the German dyestuff monopoly was of extreme danger to the safety
of the United States. Therefore when he was asked in a Senate Committee
investigation whether the German dyestuff firms should be excluded for-
ever, he answered in the affirmative. In 1919 he sold 558 patents and one
trademark belonging to the Elberfelder Farben Fabriken Bayer and Co.
to Sterling Products Co.7' The dyestuff patents of other firms were sold
to Chemical Foundation, Inc. But these two groups of patents came back
under the control, or at least strong influence, of the predecessors of I. G.
Farben. The dyestuff patents sold to Sterling were not of immediate in-
terest to that firm which was producing only pharmaceuticals. Sterling
Products sold its dyestuff interests to Grasseli Chemical Co. In 1924 the
Grasseli Chemical Co. came to an agreement with Elberfelder Farben
Fabriken Bayer and Co. and another predecessor firm of the I. G. Farben,
the Farbwerke vorm. Meister, Lucius and Bruening. In accordance with
this understanding the Grasseli Chemical Co. assigned all dyestuff patents
to a new corporation, the Grasseli Dyestuff Corp., to which Bayer assigned
its present and future United States patents and trademarks relating to
the manufacture of dyestuffs granted or applied for after the end of the
war. Bayer acquired an interest of 5o per cent in the patents while
Grasseli Chemical kept 5o per cent. Later the Hoechster Farbwerke ac-
quired a sub-interest under Bayer. In 1925 the participation in Grasseli
Dyestuff was changed when Grasseli Chemical reduced its participation
to 35 per cent, and Bayer reduced its participation to 30 per cent, while the
balance was assigned to H. A. Metz as trustee for Hoechster Farbwerke
and to other predecessor firms of I. G. Farben. In the same year this com-
pany became the exclusive selling agent in the United States for all dye-
stuffs of the I. G. Farben firms. Grasseli Chemical changed its name to
General Dyestuff Corp. The personnel of this firm was obtained by com-
bining the dyestuff sales personnel of Grasseli Chemical, which was taken
over by du Pont, with the dyestuff personnel of the firms of H. A. Metz
and Kuttroff Pickardt and Co. General Dyestuff was optioned to I. G.
Farben in 1926, and in 1928 I. G. Farben acquired all the shares of this
corporation and its name was changed to General Aniline Works.
There was another method by which the German dyestuff corporations
returned to the American markets. The Chemical Foundation issued an
71 See Report of Alien Property Custodian, S. Doc, i8r, 67th Cong. 2d Sess. (1922).
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import license, after the War Trade Board had given its consent, to Kut-
troff Pickardt Co., Synthetic Nitrogen Products Corp., and General Dye-
stuff Corporation. Kuttroff applied for licenses on certain of the patents
of Chemical Foundation, Inc., all of which were granted. These licenses,
in conjunction with the devices discussed above, opened the way for re-
newed importation of important German dyestuffs protected by patents
both new and old.
As soon as these devices had accomplished their purpose, the German-
owned subsidiary plant-the General Aniline Works manufacturing
products within the United States-had an immediate advantage because
products manufactured by any other foreign competitor, for instance,
Swiss competitors, were excluded under the above mentioned provision of
the American tariff act. Any domestic competition that arose could be
excluded by patents newly granted for dyestuffs.
Here then is the basis for one of the most important devices which gave
German industry a chance in spite of all exclusionary legislation, inas-
much as these domestic subsidiaries enjoyed all benefits provided for do-
mestic corporations. Any kind of exclusionary legislation passed in addi-
tion to that already in existence now worked in favor of the German-
controlled subsidiary.
In 1932 Imperial Chemicals joined the German-Swiss-French cartel;
thus the entire front outside of the United States was consolidated.
This international cartel controlled within the United States the following
subsidiaries in the dyestuff field: General Aniline, Ciba, Inc., Sandoz, Inc.,
Geigy, Inc., and Cincinnati Chemical Corporation.72 Furthermore, it con-
trolled sales agencies and several manufacturing plants in almost every
Latin American country of great importance. Although the United States
subsidiaries ostensibly did not become members of the cartel, actually
they were subject to the active control and direction of the cartel man-
agers. The technique of controlling subsidiaries was implemented by the
use of the patent system. Since the cartel firms had patents in every coun-
try of the Americas they could exclude the United States subsidiaries
from the Latin American market by assigning only the United States
patent to the subsidiary. Then, should the subsidiary supply any firm in
a country outside the United States without the permission of the owner
of the patent in that country, it would violate that patent. This form of
international cartel is directed from without against the interest of the
United States by means of the subsidiary device and from within by the
patent device.
712 See United States v. Allied Chemical and Dye Corp., io U.S.L. Week 2779 (1942), for
indictment of United States members of this cartel.
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There is another kind of international cartel in which the situation is
different. In some cases the German position was not strong enough
either to prevent the establishment of a plant in the United States, and
thereby to use all benefits granted by the United States tariff legislation,
or to exclude foreign and American competition by establishing subsidiar-
ies in this country. Then German industrialists had to look for an Ameri-
can enterprise which was interested in those patents, either because it had
other patents which could be made much more useful and valuable by
exercising the license of the German patents, or which was afraid of the
use of these patents in this country as a competitive means against its
own products. As a practical matter then the American firm was willing
to pay substantial amounts of money either to participate in the German
patents or to exclude them or to exchange its own patents for the German
patents. In these situations another form of international cartel was es-
tablished. An interesting instance is the production of electric light bulbs.
As was mentioned above, even before the outbreak of the last world war
there was an electric light bulb patent association which made possible a
complete exchange of all General Electric patents for all patents of other
members. This system was resumed as soon as the last world war came to
an end. At the end of 1924 the entire world electric light bulb production
outside the United States was formally cartelized by two agreements: i)
the general patent and development agreement and 2) the agreement
establishing the Phoebus S. A. (Compagnie Industrielle pour le D&
veloppement de l'Eclair A.G.).73 Phoebus had to guarantee to a certain
extent the distribution of markets, the standardization of products, and
restriction of production. The fact that the United States is not a member
of this cartel because of the antitrust legislation did not impress the presi-
dent of the German electric bulb company, 0sram G.m.b.H.K.G. 4 The
participation of an American enterprise in a world cartel chiefly through
the device of patent exchange became very common. The full conse-
quences of this device did not become clear before Hitler came to power.
Its destructive character from the point of view of American security will
be discussed later.
The only case in which this device became more like a partnership than
like a cartel agreement was the Standard Oil-I.G. Farben case.75 Carl
73 This cartel took the same form mentioned above in connection with the first German
cartel, Rheinische Kohlen Syndikat.
74 Meinhardt, Kartellstelle des deutschen Reichsverbands der Industrie 43 (1929).
75 On March 25, 1942, the United States Government and Standard Oil entered into a con-
sent decree invalidating this agreement. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey,
C.C.H. Trade Reg. Serv. 52,768 (D.C. N.J. 1942).
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Bosch, the president of I. G. Farben, described the purpose of this agree-
ment in the following way:
In the field of the hydrogenation of coal our position is not easy. Therefore we have
attempted to find means of cooperating with the big American oil concern, Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey. The field of the petroleum industry is so large.and so completely
under the control of three large concerns that the consideration of a new production
method in a fight against these concerns would have been very difficult.
In the nitrogen field the conditions were quite different. When we began to produce
nitrogen we knew that we could produce profitably using the available technical equip-
ment. However, in the field of hydrogenation of coal we knew from the very beginning
that it would be years before we could tell whether or not production could be main-
tained at a price level which would make competition possible. Even if this question
could be decided in advance there was the expense of transforming small quantity ex-
periments into production schemes of marketable quantities. The problem of obtain-
ing liquid fuel out of coal is extremely important and its solution is in the national in-
terest. If we had been forced to fight the large American oil companies the financial
needs would have exceeded any immediately available funds.
Therefore we believed it best to come to an agreement with the petroleum concerns.
.... We made an agreement with Standard Oil by which they might use our proc-
ess for treating raw oil in the United States. Our joint research work, which was to be
the basis of the establishment of large research plants in three refineries of Standard
Oil in the United States, proved quite soon that the agreement had to be amended.
The business of the Standard Oil is not limited to the United States but covers all the
countries of the world. Therefore it proved to be impossible to develop new processes
to use and refine oil and its products in the United States and at the same time to re-
strict the foreign subsidiaries of Standard Oil from using these processes. We learned
more and more that we were divulging important discoveries gained in our experi-
mentations with coal and tar hydrogenation by collaborating on the hydrogenation-of-
oil problem. The two processes are very closely related. With respect to the coal
hydrogenation which is of some importance to Standard Oil, especially in regard to
countries which have cheap coal but no natural resources, it will become even more
important to Standard Oil when natural oil becomes scarce in the United States. In
regard to this process we had no agreement.
To meet this situation and to make sure that our processes would be developed with
the greatest possible profit, we decided in 1929 to establish a holding company with
Standard Oil, the Standard I. G. Company, and to assign to this company the right
of using all our patents in the field of hydrogenation in all the world outside of Ger-
many. Standard Oil promised to bring in its patents in the same field. We intended to
permit not only Standard Oil and its subsidiaries but the other large oil concerns or
other proper firms to use our processes in the fields of oil, coal, and tin hydrogenation.
The management of the new company was entrusted to Standard Oil.
We reserved for ourselves, however, the exclusive right to use our new process in
Germany and we made a special agreement in regard to the manufacture of gasoline
by us for the German market. The conditions of this agreement protect our interests7
6
76 Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen
Wirtschaft. Verhandlungen und Berichte. 3 Die deutsche chemische Industrie 63o (1930).
DYNAMICS OF GERMAN CARTELS AND PATENTS
Bosch's statement makes it clear that the principal idea is to meet the
requirements of the German military effort by producing substitutes,
even if more expensive than any available natural raw material. This can
only be done if the owners of the natural products were driven from the
German market or bribed by high prices not to undersell the substitutes.
Bosch, an honest friend of peace, became, against his own wishes, the
founder of the National Socialist trade policy. He states dearly that he
had no chance to develop the hydrogenation plants in the fight against the
American petroleum firms selling natural oil, because of the impossibility
of competing in price with the natural product. The high price was for
Standard Oil an inducement, and for I. G. Farben the condition, of de-
veloping new processes in the oil field without which any idea of rearma-
ment was necessarily hopeless.
All forms of international cartel agreements, no matter whether offen-
sive or defensive, deprived the German government of even its internation-
al influence. Thus the international policy came to an increasing extent
under the control of private groups cooperating with corresponding foreign
groups. The list of the members of the committee sent by the government
to Russia contains representatives of cartels and monopolies, although
that agreement was the only governmental contribution to the solution of
economic problems at this time. Perhaps the Russian government pre-
ferred to negotiate with them because it realized the allocation of the ac-
tual power within Germany.
In 1932 the whole process had developed to the point where the German
government had lost its power to formulate domest'c and foreign policy.
The attempts of Chancellors Bruening and Schleicher to restore the state
failed. Their only serious attempt to fight can be seen in an emergency
decree of the Bruening government decreasing all cartelized and monopo-
lized prices by io per cent. The effect of this decree was frustrated by
many policy devices of the "pluralistic" powers. In labor policy the un-
ions followed exactly the same line. They were opposed to any govern-
mental solution of the social situation and were rather in favor of extend-
ing their own powers to the greatest extent. For example the Berlin sub-
way strike in 1932 was their answer to the attempt of the government to
adapt wages to the depression. This was the condition of the German
nation on the eve of Hitler's rise to power. §
§ The development of cartels and patent law under Hitler will be dealt with in a forthcoming
issue of the Review.
